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The virus emerged in China in the winter of 1957 and spread 
rapidly worldwide via ships, aeroplanes, and trains. In April, 
it sparked a major epidemic in Hong Kong, where about 
250 000 people were infected, and by June India had seen 
over a million cases. Shortly afterwards, it made landfall in 
the UK, and by September outbreaks were being reported 
in England, Wales, and Scotland. General practitioners were 
“amazed at the extraordinary infectivity of the disease” 
and the suddenness with which it attacked younger age 
groups. Yet, while some members of the College of General 
Practitioners called for the UK Government to issue a 
warning about the dangers presented by the virus and 
coordinate a national response, the ministry of health 
demurred. Instead, the virus was permitted to run its course.
The 1957 outbreak was not caused by a coronavirus—the 
first human coronavirus would not be discovered until 1965—
but by an influenza virus. However, in 1957, no one could be 
sure that the virus that had been isolated in Hong Kong was a 
new pandemic strain or simply a descendant of the previous 
1918–19 pandemic influenza virus.
The result was that as the UK’s weekly death count 
mounted, peaking at about 600 in the week ending 
Oct 17, 1957, there were few hysterical tabloid newspaper 
headlines and no calls for social distancing. Instead, the 
news cycle was dominated by the Soviet Union’s launch 
of Sputnik and the aftermath of the fire at the Windscale 
nuclear reactor in the UK.
By the time this influenza pandemic—known colloquially 
at the time as “Asian flu”—had concluded the following 
April, an estimated 20 000 people in the UK and 
80 000 citizens in the USA were dead. Worldwide, the 
pandemic, sparked by a new H2N2 influenza subtype, 
would result in more than 1 million deaths.
The subsequent 1968 influenza pandemic—or 
“Hong Kong flu” or “Mao flu” as some western tabloids 
dubbed it—would have an even more dramatic impact, 
killing more than 30 000 individuals in the UK and 
100 000 people in the USA, with half the deaths among 
individuals younger than 65 years—the reverse of COVID-19 
deaths in the current pandemic. Yet, while at the height 
of the outbreak in December, 1968, The New York Times 
described the pandemic as “one of the worst in the nation’s 
history”, there were few school closures and businesses, for 
the most, continued to operate as normal.
The relative unconcern about two of the largest influenza 
pandemics of the 20th century—the Encyclopaedia Britannica 
estimates that the 1968 pandemic, due to an H3N2 influenza 
virus, was responsible for between 1 million to 4 million 
deaths globally—presents a marked contrast and, to some 
critics, a rebuke to today’s response to COVID-19 and the 
heightened responses to outbreaks of other novel pathogens, 
such as avian and swine influenza. “When hysteria is rife, we 
might try some history”, opined Simon Jenkins in an article 
in The Guardian titled “Why I’m taking the coronavirus hype 
with a pinch of salt”. “The [1968] pandemic raged over 
three years, yet is largely forgotten today”, commented 
The Wall Street Journal, “a testament to how societies are now 
approaching a similar crisis in a much different way”.
The ultimate testament to the supposed stoicism of 
earlier generations, according to this line of thought, is the 
1918–19 influenza pandemic, in which at least 50 million 
people worldwide perished, but which resulted in few 
public monuments and was largely “forgotten” by the 
collectivity of society.
But were people really more stoical in 1918, 1957, and 
1968? Or were there other factors that might account 
for the dampened social and emotional responses to 
these pandemics? And what should historians make of 
functionalist and, arguably, selective readings of history 
that seek to draw moral lessons from the past?
To answer these questions it is necessary to understand the 
origins of the modern preoccupation with pandemics. Before 
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British navy sailors in bed because of influenza in a warehouse near Ipswich, 
UK, which was transformed into an infirmary for 850 sailors, Sept 19, 1957
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the mid-19th century, few medical commentators used the 
term pandemic. That only began to change in the 1890s 
with the arrival of bubonic plague from southern China—
what became known as the Third Plague Pandemic—and the 
Russian influenza pandemic that broke out in St Petersburg 
in 1889 and which was seen to spread rapidly to Berlin, 
London, and New York through ship and rail connections.
However, perhaps the crucial factor was the way 
that Victorian epidemiology and the science of vital 
statistics made the pandemic form of influenza “visible” 
to physicians in the UK who had long been sceptical of 
influenza, then viewed by some as a suspect Italian term 
for the common cold.
Statistics had long been used in the insurance and 
annuity businesses, but it was only in the 1840s that 
William Farr, the chief statistician to the General Register 
Office in the UK, began to use statistics in a systematic 
way to measure variations in the health of populations 
and the occurrence of epidemics. One of the most 
powerful tools in Farr’s kit was the “excess death rate”, 
calculated by subtracting the number of deaths observed 
during an epidemic from the average during non-
epidemic seasons.
In 1847–48, Farr had observed that influenza increased 
respiratory deaths in London by about 5000 compared 
with non-epidemic years. However, because of the difficulty 
of distinguishing influenza from other respiratory diseases, 
physicians had attributed just 1157 deaths to influenza and 
the remainder to asthma, bronchitis, and pneumonia.
To persuade doctors of their error, and convince them 
that influenza ought to be taken as seriously as cholera and 
other notifiable diseases, Farr tabulated excess respiratory 
deaths and made them a regular feature of the annual 
mortality tables. In this way, he thought, statistics would 
spur sanitary reform and “banish panic”.
What Farr could not have foreseen is that by making the 
risks presented by influenza and other forms of respiratory 
disease more visible to the medical profession, his statistical 
innovations would have the opposite effect. This was partly 
because it now became possible to measure the intervals 
between the peaks in excess deaths from respiratory 
diseases and show that influenza pandemics occurred in 
waves, with the second and third waves frequently resulting 
in more severe disease, and more deaths, than the first. 
Forearmed with this knowledge, medical officers of health 
could alert populations to the pandemic threat ahead of 
time and issue advice on isolation and social distancing 
measures designed to reduce the peaks or, as we would say 
today, flatten the curve.
Another crucial factor was the media: thanks to the 
expansion of telegraphic communications and the growth 
of mass market newspapers in the late Victorian period, it 
now became possible to telegraph news of the spreading 
infection ahead of its arrival, hence The Lancet’s claim 
in 1890 that “dread” of the Russian influenza had been 
“started by telegraph”.
Some critics of the UK Government’s response to 
COVID-19 have levelled similar charges at today’s tabloid 
press and at disease modellers whose initial forecast 
that, in the absence of suppressive measures, severe 
acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 could result 
in the deaths of 500 000 people in the UK has been 
widely credited with persuading the UK Government to 
reverse course and institute a strict lockdown. But is it 
really necessary, they ask, to risk plunging the UK into 
an economic depression through lockdown measures 
designed to prevent a wave of mortality given that deaths 
attributed to COVID-19 are broadly in line with those seen 
in previous pandemic years? There was no panic in 1957 
and 1968, runs this argument, so why the panic today?
It is questionable whether deaths attributed to COVID-19 
are comparable to those recorded during previous 
influenza pandemics, given that between March and early 
May, 2020, alone the UK Office for National Statistics 
recorded 55 000 excess deaths compared with the same 
period last year. Furthermore, it will not be possible to 
obtain an accurate accounting of the total excess deaths 
due to COVID-19 in 2020 before 2021 at the earliest and by 
then, assuming a vaccine is not deployed in the meantime, 
A typist in Manchester, UK, during the 1957 influenza pandemic
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many thousands more people will most likely have died 
from COVID-19. However, critics of the UK Government’s 
response are perhaps right to point to the role of 
epidemiology and statistical modelling in propagating fear.
Unlike today, in 1957 epidemiologists did not have the 
ability to track the emergence of a novel pathogen in China—
indeed, the initial signal was missed by WHO, meaning 
that the first that influenza experts knew of the “Asian flu” 
pandemic was when The New York Times published the report 
about the outbreak in Hong Kong. In 1957, virologists 
did not understand the genetic mechanisms behind the 
emergence of new pandemic strains, hence the initial 
confusion as to whether this influenza virus was a variation 
of the H1N1 influenza virus of 1918.
More importantly, realising that influenza was usually 
associated with mild or inapparent infections and that 
quarantines were impractical, public health authorities in 
the USA and the UK made no effort to mitigate the spread 
of the infection by, for instance, introducing border checks 
or strict isolation measures. Nor did governments consider 
suppressing the basic reproduction number to buy time for 
hospitals and front-line health workers: as Hugh Pennington, 
then a young medical student at St Thomas’ Hospital, London, 
UK, recalled in a recent article in the London Review of Books, 
this was because intensive care units were not yet established 
in 1957 and ventilator technology was rudimentary. Nor, 
when the second wave of the pandemic arrived in the autumn 
of 1957, were hospitals overwhelmed by patients. Similarly, 
a review of hospital admissions in Pittsburgh, Baltimore, 
and New York, USA, during the 1968 pandemic found that 
although patient numbers increased by 3%, hospitals coped 
with the influx. Indeed, the only real strategy considered by 
health authorities in the UK and the USA was vaccination, 
but the vaccines arrived too late in both the 1957 and 1968 
influenza pandemics to make a difference.
Not everyone was happy with the UK Government’s 
passivity, however. “The public seems under the impres-
sion that nothing can be done to prevent the calamity that 
is threatened by the advance of influenza in the Far East”, 
argued Dr Kitching in a letter to the BMJ in June, 1957. “On the 
contrary there is a great deal that the Government can do; by 
acting at once they may save hundreds of thousands of lives.”
But the ministry of health was not listening. Instead, 
fearing that the press would have a field day if it issued 
a prominent warning about the pandemic, it left it to 
local medical officers of health to decide on the most 
appropriate course of action. “The general assessment 
seems to be that eventually [the influenza] will affect up to 
20 percent of the population”, wrote the then junior health 
minister John Vaughan-Morgan. “This is a heaven-sent 
topic for the press during the ‘silly season’”.
Vaughan-Morgan was right to be concerned about the 
press’s reaction. At the end of July, 1957, the Daily Mail issued 
a dire warning about a “new outbreak of Asian flu” when a 
1-year-old girl fell ill in Fulham. The Guardian surrendered 
its cool editorial tone for a headline reading: “Crash Fight 
Against Asian ‘Flu’”.
However, such headlines were the exception and for 
the most part newspapers seem to have behaved respon-
sibly during the pandemic. Publishers were also reluctant to 
be seen to be stoking public fears, a reflection perhaps of 
heightened anxieties due to the Cold War and the launch 
of Sputnik, as well as greater respect for medical experts 
and deference to authority.
Indeed, Charles Graves, the brother of the novelist 
Robert Graves, recalled how when news of the influenza 
outbreak reached his publisher, Icon, it put the publication 
of his book Invasion by Virus on hold, citing concerns 
about “frightening the public”. The result was that it was 
not until 1968 that Icon finally agreed to release the title, 
having been reassured in the meantime that influenza 
in 1957 “was no real killer”. In his book Graves compared 
the 1957 and 1968 pandemics to that of the 1918–19 
influenza pandemic and asked “Could it happen again?” 
His answer was yes and that the UK had been lucky 
that the recent pandemics had been of a “mild type” of 
influenza. He closed by reassuring readers that history 
was unlikely to repeat itself before 1998, “by which time 
the medical profession will know a great deal more about 
immunisation that it did in 1918—or does now.”
Graves was right on both counts, but wrong to think 
that better medical knowledge of vaccines and statistical 
modelling would reduce public anxiety about pandemics.
Mark Honigsbaum
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